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Abstract—A body area network is a network of nodes
around human bodies. Body area networks are associated with
human body, and collect sensitive information of users. If this
information cannot be properly protected, users would stop
using these applications. IEEE Std 802.15.6 is a standard for
body area networks; it provides several security association
protocols. In this paper, password authenticated association
protocol in the standard is reviewed. First of all, several attacks
are found. In addition, we proposed an improved protocol that
can avoid these attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Body area network (BAN) is a network of nodes to be
deployed in, on, or around the human body. BANs are useful
in many applications including sports training and chronic
diseases monitoring.
BANs requires security protections. BANs are associated
with human body, and collect sensitive information of users.
If this information cannot be properly protected, users would
stop using these applications. The ﬁrst step of security
protection is usually security association, or cryptographic
key establishment procedure.
So far, many BAN association protocols have been pro-
posed. Most of them are based on a pre-deployment phase,
in which secrets are distributed. Some other interesting
protocols are listed as follows: Balfanz et al. [2], Gehrmann
et al [4], Vaudenay [9], Cagalj et al. [3], Wong and Stajano
[10], and Huang et al. [5], [8], [7], [6].
IEEE Std 802.15.6 [1] is a standard for BANs, which pro-
vides a series of security association protocols. This paper
studies the password authenticated association protocol in
IEEE 802.15.6 speciﬁcation. Our main research questions
are:
• Is the password authenticated association protocol se-
cure?
• If not, how can we improve it?
After study this protocol, we ﬁnd several attacks against it.
Also, an improved protocol is proposed and evaluated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
explains password authenticated association protocol. Sec-
tion 3 describes three attacks against this protocol. Section
4 gives an improved password authenticated association
protocol; this improved protocol is also evaluated in this
section. Finally, conclusions are made in Section 5.
II. PASSWORD AUTHENTICATED ASSOCIATION
In this section, we will introduce IEEE 802.15.6 password
authenticated association protocol. The protocol establishes
a security association between two communicating parties,
a node (the initiator I) and a hub (the responder R), for
establishing a shared master key (MK).
This security association protocol is based on the Elliptic
Curve Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange protocol. The elliptic
curve is characterized as:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod p,
with a, b ∈ GF (p), 4a3 + 27b2 = 0
Relevant symbols in the equation are explained as follows.
• (x, y) is a point in the curve.
• GF (p) is a prime ﬁnite ﬁeld.
• p is an odd prime.
• a and b are coefﬁcients.
• G = (Gx, Gy) is the base point.
• r is the order of the base point G.
Suppose SKI and PKI are the private key and public
key of I; SKR and PKR are the private key and public key
of R. Their relations are:
PKI = SKI ×G, PKR = SKR ×G
where × denotes scalar multiplication of the base point G
by an integer.
Other symbols used in this section are listed below.
• NI : nonce generated by the initiator
• NR: nonce generated by the responder
• PK ′I : scrambled public key of the initiator
• RMB(·) and LMR(·) represent the right most 128
bits and the left most 128 bits of a certain input,
respectively.
• PW : the password shared between I and R.
• The cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC)
algorithm is speciﬁed in the NIST Special Publication
800-38B. The notation CMAC(K,M,L) represents
the L-bit output of the CMAC applied under key K to
message M based on the AES forward cipher function.
This protocol assumes that the initiator and the responder
pre-share a password. From the standpoint of security, this
protocol can be simpliﬁed as follows.
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1. I computes a password-scrambled public key as follows
PK ′I = PKI −Q(PW )
where Q(PW ) is a function that maps PW to a point
on the elliptic curve. I sends R the identities, a nonce
and PK ′I
{R, I,NI , PK ′I}
2. R responds to I with the identities, a nonce and its
public key.
{I, R,NR, PKR}




At this stage, I and R compute a shared secret K:
K = SKI × PKR = SKR × PKI
R computes a message authentication code as follows:
M3 = CMAC64(RMB(K), I, R,NI , NR)
R sends I the identities, the nonce NR, its public key,
and M3.
{I,R,NR, PKR,M3}
4. I computes a message authentication code as follows:
M4 = CMAC64(RMB(K), R, I,NR, NI)
I sends R the identities, the nonce NI , its public key,
and M4.
{R, I,NI , PKI ,M4}
Finally, each party computes the shared master key MK
as follows:
MK = CMAC128(LMB(K), NI , NR)
III. ATTACKS
In this section, we will introduce several attacks against
the IEEE 802.15.6 password authenticated association pro-
tocol.
A. Initiator Impersonation
The problem of the IEEE 802.15.6 password authenticated
association protocol is that the protocol reveals PKI in
step 4. Thus the adversary can impersonate the initiator as
follows.
1. A intercepts the step 4.
{R, I,NI , PKI ,M4}
Now A knows PKI . A computes
PK ′I − PKI + PKA = PKA −Q(PW )
2. A makes R re-run the protocol. A sends R the identi-
ties, a nonce and PKA −Q(PW )
{R, I,NA, PKA −Q(PW )}
3. R responds to A with the identities, a nonce and its
public key PKR in this round.
{I, R,NR, PKR}
4. R recovers PKA as follows
PKA = PKA −Q(PW ) +Q(PW )
At this stage, A and R compute a shared secret K:
K = SKA × PKR = SKR × PKA
where SKR is the private key corresponding to PKR.
R computes a message authentication code as follows:
M3 = CMAC64(RMB(K), I, R,NA, NR)
R sends A the identities, the nonce NR, its public key,
and M3.
{I, R,NR, PKR,M3}
5. A computes a message authentication code as follows:
M4 = CMAC64(RMB(K), R, I,NR, NA)
A sends R the identities, the nonce NA, its public key,
and M4.
{R, I,NA, PKI ,M4}
Finally, the attacker and the responder (the hub) have a
shared master key MK:
MK = CMAC128(LMB(K), NA, NR)
The responder thinks that it has the shared master key MK
with I , however it actually has the shared master key MK
with the attacker.
B. Responder Impersonation
The IEEE 802.15.6 password authenticated association
protocol reveals PKI in step 4. Thus the adversary can also
impersonate the responder as follows.
1. A intercepts the step 4.
{R, I,NI , PKI ,M4}
Now A knows PKI . A computes
PKI − PK ′I = Q(PW )
2. A makes I re-run the protocol. I sends A the identities,
a nonce and PK
′
I (the scrambled public key of I in
this round)
{R, I,NI , PK ′I}
3. A responds to I with the identities, a nonce and its
public key.
{I,R,NA, PKA}
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At this stage, I and A compute a shared secret K:
K = SKI × PKA = SKA × PKI
where SKI is the private key corresponding to PKI .
A computes a message authentication code as follows:
M3 = CMAC64(RMB(K), I, R,NI , NA)
A sends I the identities, the nonce NA, its public key,
and M3.
{I, R,NA, PKA,M3}
5. I computes a message authentication code as follows:
M4 = CMAC64(RMB(K), R, I,NA, NI)
I sends A the identities, the nonce NI , its public key,
and M4.
{R, I,NI , PKI ,M4}
Finally, the attacker and the initiator (the node) have a
shared master key MK:
MK = CMAC128(LMB(K), NI , NA)
The initiator thinks that it has the shared master key MK
with R, however it actually has the shared master key MK
with the attacker.
C. Man-in-the-Middle Attack
The adversary can also initiate the man-in-the-middle
attack as follows.
1. A intercepts the step 4.
{R, I,NI , PKI ,M4}
Now A knows PKI . A computes
PK ′I − PKI + PKA = PKA −Q(PW )
and
PKI − PK ′I = Q(PW )
2. A makes I re-run the protocol. I sends A the identities,
a nonce and PK
′
I
{R, I,NI , PK ′I}
2′. A makes R re-run the protocol. A sends R the identi-
ties, a nonce and PKA −Q(PW )
{R, I,NA, PKA −Q(PW )}
3. R responds to A with the identities, a nonce and its
public key.
{I, R,NR, PKR}
3′. A responds to I with the identities, a nonce and its
public key.
{I,R,NA, PKA}
4. R recovers PKA as follows
PKA = PKA −Q(PW ) +Q(PW )
At this stage, A and R compute a shared secret K:
K = SKA × PKR = SKR × PKA
R computes a message authentication code as follows:
M3 = CMAC64(RMB(K), I, R,NA, NR)
R sends A the identities, the nonce NR, its public key,
and M3.
{I, R,NR, PKR,M3}




At this stage, I and A compute a shared secret K:
K = SKI × PKA = SKA × PKI
A computes a message authentication code as follows:
M3 = CMAC64(RMB(K), I, R,NI , NA)
A sends I the identities, the nonce NA, its public key,
and M3.
{I, R,NA, PKA,M3}
5. I computes a message authentication code as follows:
M4 = CMAC64(RMB(K), R, I,NA, NI)
I sends A the identities, the nonce NI , its public key,
and M4.
{R, I,NI , PKI ,M4}
5′. A computes a message authentication code as follows:
M4 = CMAC64(RMB(K), R, I,NR, NA)
A sends R the identities, the nonce NA, its public key,
and M4.
{R, I,NA, PKI ,M4}
Finally, the attacker and the responder (the hub) have a
shared master key:
CMAC128(LMB(K), NA, NR)
The attacker and the initiator (the node) have a shared master
key:
CMAC128(LMB(K), NI , NA)
The initiator and responder thinks that they have a shared
master key, however each of them actually has a shared
master keys with the attacker.
IV. IMPROVED PROTOCOL
In this section, we will introduce an improved IEEE
802.15.6 password authenticated association protocol. Also,
we will analyze this improved protocol.
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A. Protocol Description
The difference between the improved protocol and the
original version is that PKI will not be sent in step 4. The
whole protocol procedure is introduced as follows.
1. I computes a password-scrambled public key as follows
PK ′I = PKI −Q(PW )
where Q(PW ) is a function that maps PW to a point
on the elliptic curve. I sends R the identities, a nonce
and PK ′I
{R, I,NI , PK ′I}
2. R responds to I with the identities, a nonce and its
public key.
{I, R,NR, PKR}




At this stage, I and R compute a shared secret K:
K = SKI × PKR = SKR × PKI
R computes a message authentication code as follows:
M3 = CMAC64(RMB(K), I, R,NI , NR)
R sends I the identities, the nonce NR, its public key,
and M3.
{I,R,NR, PKR,M3}
4. I computes a message authentication code as follows:
M4 = CMAC64(RMB(K), R, I,NR, NI)
I sends R the identities, the nonce NI , its public key,
and M4.
{R, I,NI ,M4}
Finally, each party computes the shared master key MK
as follows:
MK = CMAC128(LMB(K), NI , NR)
B. Security
Security properties of our new protocol is analyzed below.
1) Authenticity: Firstly, assume that the attacker aims to
replace PKR to PKA (responder impersonation or in a
man-in-the-middle attack). In this case, the attacker need
to either compromise CMAC64 (the probability is able to
ignored) or compute the same K in I , which is SKI×PKR.
The best way of doing this is to get PKI from PK ′I , replace
PKR to PKA, and compute SKA ×PKI . The probability
is no better than the attacker guess the correct PW , which
is 1/2l(PW ) (unless the attacker can do a brute force attack).
Alternatively, the attacker aims to replace PKI to PKA
(initiator impersonation or in a man-in-the-middle attack). In
this case, the attacker need to either compromise CMAC64
(the probability is able to ignored) or compute the same K
in R, which is SKR × (PK ′A +Q(PW )). The probability
is no better than the attacker guess the correct PW , which
is 1/2l(PW ).
In summary, authenticity of the new protocol is dependent
on the strength of the password. However, if the password
and Q(PW ) are longer than 64 bits, CMAC64 becomes the
main factor that inﬂuence the security of this protocol.
2) The adversary is not able to derive the private key:
The only way that the attacker can derive the private key,
for example SKR, is that the attacker compute SKR =
PKR/G. These equivalent to solve the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem.
3) The adversary is not able to derive the session key:
In order to compute the session key, the adversary must
know the private key. However, as we analyzed above, the
adversary is not able to derive the private key.
4) Known-key security: Suppose a previous session key
K1 is disclosed, the adversary is unable to derive the current
session key K2. The reason is that the initiator and responder
re-generate the private and public key in each round.
5) Perfect forward secrecy: Suppose the password is
disclosed in the future, the adversary is unable to derive
the current session key. The reason is that the session key is
computed using temporary public/private keys and nonces,
which will be discarded after each protocol run.
C. Performance
In Table I, the performance of our protocol is compared to
several other association protocols. asyI is the the number
of asymmetric cryptographic computations in I; asyR is the
the number of asymmetric cryptographic computations in R;
Msg is the number of messages transmitted in the protocol;
and related notes are in the last column.
As we can see, the performance of this protocol is
acceptable. Given that hub is usually powerful, asymmetric
cryptographic computation twice or once will not make
much difference. The main advantage of this protocol is
that it does not need other communication channels such
as visible light communication channels (VLC) or human
users compare two 16-bit digest in two devices, which are
required in many other association protocols.
Note that manual messages such as button pushing is not
counted as a message. ’-’ means that the protocol has not
speciﬁed its key exchange method. Correspondingly, +k
means that k messages will be added to the number of
messages in a key exchange protocol.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a review of password
authenticated association protocol in the IEEE 802.15.6
standard. Several attacks have been found. In addition,
an improved protocol is proposed. Based on our analysis,
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Table I
PERFORMANCE
Protocol asyI asyR Msg Note
Improved protocol 2 2 4 user input password
IETa [5] 2 2 5 user compare digests
IETb [5] 2 2 5 user compare digests
health [8] 2 2 3 user compare digests
HLCa [7] 2 1 3 require VLC
HLCb [7] 2 1 4 require VLC
VLCa [6] 2 2 3 require VLC
VLCb [6] 2 1 5 require VLC
DH-SC [3] 2 2 5 user compare short strings
DH-DB [3] 2 2 6 + k k messages for distance bounding
DH-IC [3] 2 2 5
MANA I [3] - - +1 user enters a random key and a MAC
MANA II [3] - - +2 user compares random key and MAC values
MANA III [3] - - +5 user enters a random key to both devices
Vaudenay [9] - - 4 string comparison in out-of-band channels
Wong-Stajano I [10] 2 2 3 hash comparison in out-of-band channels
Wong-Stajano II [10] 2 2 6 string comparison in out-of-band channels
Wong-Stajano III [10] 2 2 4 string comparison in out-of-band channels
this new protocol can prevent attacks we found. This pro-
tocol also have some other good security properties, for
example, known-key security and perfect forward secrecy.
The performance study shows that the computation and
communication burden is acceptable, and it does not rely on
some special communication channels (for example, visible
light communication channels).
In the next stage, we will try to ﬁnd more improved
protocols with good security properties and performance.
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